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Bloody Coup: Death of Ironsi, Fajuyi in the July 29, 1966 Coup D’état

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By Chuks Iloegbunam

The first shots shattered the peace of the night at the Abeokuta Garrison of the Nigerian Army a few minutes after midnight on July 29, 1966. Three casualties lay instantly dead in the persons of Lieutenant Colonel Gabriel Okonweze, the Garrison Commander, Major John Obienu, Commander of the 2nd Reece Squadron, and Lieutenant E. B. Orok, also of the Reece Squadron. It was the beginning of the much-touted revenge coup of Northern Nigerian army officers and men against the regime of Major General Johnson Thomas Umunnakwe Aguiyi-Ironsi. By August 1, when Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon assumed power in Lagos as Nigeria’s second military Head of State, the bullet ridden bodies of both Ironsi and his host, Lieutenant Colonel Francis Adekunle Fajuyi, the military Governor of Western Nigeria, lay buried in shallow graves at Iwo, outside Ibadan. “Within three days of the July outbreak, every Igbo soldier serving in the army outside the East was dead, imprisoned or fleeing eastward for his life”, observed Professor Ruth First in The Barrel of a Gun: The Politics of Coups d’Etat in Africa [Allen Lane The Penguin Press, London, 1970, p317…Click Here To Continue Reading>> …Click Here To Continue Reading>>

 

But Africa’s bloodiest coup did not stop at that stage, despite the shooting to death of 42 officers and over 130 other ranks, who were overwhelmingly Igbo. The killing sprees and ever-expanding killing fields spread like wild fire across most of the country. There were three phases to the coup – the Araba/Aware massacres in northern Nigeria pre-July that called for northern secession, the July Army bloodbath, and the ethnic cleansing that went on for months after Ironsi had been assassinated and his regime toppled.The maelstrom prompted Colonel Gowon into making a radio broadcast on September 29, 1966. This was the kernel of what he said: “You all know that since the end of July, God in his power has entrusted the responsibility of this great country of ours into the hands of yet another Northerner. I receive complaints daily that up till now Easterners living in the North are being killed and molested, and their property looted. I am very unhappy about this. We should put a stop to it. It appears that it is going beyond reason and is now at a point of recklessness and irresponsibility.”

But Gowon’s salutary intervention changed nothing, as the massacres continued unabated. Northern soldiers and civilians went into towns, fished out Easterners and flattened them either with rapid gunfire or with violent machete blows, leaving their properties looted or torched. According to the Massacre of Ndigbo in 1966: Report of the Justice G. C. M. Onyiuke Tribunal, [Tollbrook Limited, Ikeja, Lagos] “…between 45,000 and 50,000 civilians of former Eastern Nigeria were killed in Northern Nigeria and other parts of Nigeria from 29th May 1966 to December 1967 and although it is not strictly within its terms of reference the Tribunal estimates that not less than 1,627,743 Easterners fled back to Eastern Nigeria as a result of the 1966 pogrom.”

This is contemporary Nigerian history, only 50 years old. But when experts like Dr. Reuben Abati and Professor Jonah Elaigwu write about it, they lose all sense of numeracy and statistical acuity, and glibly state that the July 29, 1966 counter-coup cost “many” Igbo lives. Well, the truth is that the July 29 counter-coup appears to be the bloodiest in the world’s recorded history because the casualty figures it posted far outstrip those registered in decided bloody coups like the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in which King James II of England was overthrown by an invading army led by William III of Orange-Nassau; the 18 Brumaire of 1799coup in which General Napoleon Bonaparte overthrew the French Directory on November 9, 1799; the Wuchang Uprising of 1911 that overthrew the Qing Dynasty and led to the establishment of the Republic of China; the Bolsheviks October Revolution of 1917 that led to the creation of the Soviet Union; and the Iraqi coup d’état of 1936, the first among Arab countries. Each of these coups/revolutions led to war. But none of them managed anything near the sea of blood occasioned by July 29, 1966.

Giving their interest in posting photographs and videos on the Internet by Instagram and Snapchat, and advertising mostly poor language on Facebook and other such portals, today’s Nigerian youths may know next to nothing about what led to the catastrophe of July 29. But the details follow here for those of them interested in learning. The problem sat rigidly on the superficiality of Nigeria, a geographical expression contrived by colonialist Britain. At Independence in 1960, the country operated a federal system of government with three powerful regions that didn’t take dictation from Lagos, the nation’s capital. A fourth region, the Midwest, with capital in Benin City, was created in June 1963. But destroying the very fabric of the artificial political entity were tribalism and corruption, corruption which by today’s standards, would seem like cloistered nuns delightfully engaging in a game of Ping-Pong!

There were the 1960 and 1964-1965uprisings in the Tiv country of the Middle Belt, and fractious elections in Western Nigeria in 1964 and 1965. There was the highly controversial national census exercise of 1963, and there was the military action of Isaac Boro’s Niger Delta Volunteer Force. Then, the military moved in on January 15, 1966, having contracted the germ of the idea of military putsches running riot across the world. In Algeria, for instance,Colonel Houari Boumediene and Ahmed Ben Bella overthrew Benyoucef Benkhedda on July 3, 1962. Three years later, on June 19, 1965,Boumedienne overthrew Ben Bella. More: In Argentina, General Eduardo Lonardi overthrew President Juan Domingo Peron on September 16, 1955. On March 29, 1962, General Raul Pogi overthrew President Arturo Frondizi.In Brazil on March 31, 1964, Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco overthrew João Goulart to set up a 21-year-long dictatorship. In Indonesia General Suharto overthrew President Sukarno on September 30, 1965.

Inside Africa itself, coups were also trending. Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser had overthrown Muhammad Naguib as far back as February 27, 1954. The first coup in West Africa was on January 13, 1963, when Etiene Eyadema overthrew Sylvanus Olympio. Colonel Joseph (later Mobutu SeseSeko) toppled Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba on September 14, 1960 and “neutralized” all political parties in Congo-Kinshasa. In neighbouring Benin Republic, Christophe Soglo overthrew Hubert Maga on October 28, 1963.Soglo carried out another coup on November 27, 1965, toppling Sourou-Migan Apithy. Both coups happened when the country still bore the name of Dahomey.

On New Year’s Day of 1966, Colonel Jean-Bedel Bokassa overthrew his cousin, President David Dacko in Central Africa Republic. Two days later, Lieutenant Colonel Sangoulé Lamizana overthrew President Maurice Yaméogo in Upper Volta, which was renamed Burkina Faso in 1984 by Marxist revolutionary Captain Thomas Sankara.

But there was a difference between the rash of coups that occurred elsewhere and the one of January 15, 1966 in Nigeria. The Nigerian coup took an immediate ethnic colouration, and for reasons that were all too obvious. Of the five Majors that formed the innermost circle of the plotters, four were Igbo – Patrick Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, Emmanuel Arinze Ifeajuna, Donatus Okafor, and Chris Anuforo. But there was also among them Major Adewale Ademoyega, a Yoruba. Then, there was also the more disturbing fact that most of the coup’s casualties were non-Igbo, like Prime Minister Sir Abubakar TafawaBalewa, Northern Premier Sir Ahmadu Bello, Western Premier Chief Samuel Akintola, and Federal Finance Minister Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh. No Igbo politician had lost his life in the bloody action.

Further, in executing the coup, the military had turned against itself in the killings of the following Northern military officers: Brigadier Zakariya Maimalari (Commander 2 Brigade), Colonel Kur Mohammed (Chief of Staff, Army Headquarters), Lieutenant Colonel James Yakubu Pam (Adjutant-General), and Lieutenant Colonel Lieutenant Colonel AbogoLargema (Commander 4th Battalion, Ibadan). Two Yoruba officers were also victims:Brigadier Samuel Ademulegun (Commander 1 Brigade), and his deputy, Colonel Ralph Sodeinde. The coup was, in effect, as bloody as they come. Its very nature fanned the fiction that it was an Igbo coup.

On the immediate term, the charge of an Igbo coup was understandable. What would the Igbo have said and done if things had happened differently and the coup had been perpetrated by say, Majors Hassan Usman Katsina, Murtala Muhammed, Joe Akahan, Mohammed Shuwaand Abba Kyari, and the victims been, say, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Dr. Michael Okpara, General Aguiyi-Ironsi, Colonel Conrad Nwawo and Lieutenant Colonels Michael Ivenso, Michael Okwechime and Ime Imo? They would have, of course, cried blue murder and almost certainly plotted countermeasures.

But, the true situation was clear in mere weeks and months. The coup had not been an Igbo coup for various reasons. Its primary objective was to replace Prime Minister Balewa with Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the Yoruba Leader of Opposition in the Federal Parliament. Why would Ndigbo carry out a coup in order to install a Yoruba leadership? Three of the leaders of the January 15 action testified verbally and in written form that they had marked Chief Awolowo to head a government of their own creation. This was how Major Ifeajuna rationalized their decision in his memoirs, which has remained embarrassingly unpublished for 50 years: “Chief Awolowo launched forth his party on a platform of tribalism, and for his parochial and partisan approach to national issues, he got deserving blame. But probably in the later Awolowo of after the 1959 Federal Election that began the fiasco, our people saw for a second time an image of honesty, courage and discipline. Awolowo refused to betray those who followed him; rather it was some of them that betrayed him. In the face of difficulties and personal tragedy following on the declaration of a state of emergency in Western Nigeria, his treason trial, and the death of his first son, he showed courage and firmness of belief that truly is rare. In time he came to win the respect and admiration of even his greatest detractors, and what was more, he came to represent a rallying point for the young and the intellectual, for all that sought progress and nationhood for our country.”

Chuks Iloegbunam

There were other reasons that made it plain that it was not an Igbo coup. The Igbo General Aguiyi-Ironsi crushed January 15. But, instead of being credited with the feat, Gowon allowed himself to be proclaimed the crusher of the coup, a role he hadn’t played at all. Not just that, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Chinyelu Unegbe, the Quartermaster of the Army had been felled by the coupists of January 15. He was full-blooded Igbo, from Ozubulu in today’s Anambra State. But it served the interest of the counter-coupists to deny this and lie that Chinyelu was from the “Midwest” Region.

A further consideration: On the morning of January 15, 1966, there were six Igbo Lieutenant Colonels. None participated in the coup. On that morning, there were 45 Majors in the Nigerian Army. About 24 of them were Igbo. This means that, at the very least, 18 Igbo Majors had nothing to do with the coup. On that morning, the General Officer Commanding was Igbo. The Quartermaster General was Igbo. The Commander of the 2nd Battalion in Lagos was Igbo. His 2ic was Igbo. The Brigade Major was Igbo. The Federal Guards Commander was Igbo. The Staff Officer “A” Branch at Army Headquarters was Igbo. If all these had fixed the coup, could it have failed?

But the engineers of July 29 did not want to know. People like Mallam Adamu Ciroma, then the Editor of the Northern Government-owned New Nigerian newspaper led the campaign in portraying the January action as an Igbo coup aimed at Igbo domination of Nigeria.These champions of the legend of the Igbo coup had a point, of course. But, as already pointed out above, it was a blunt one, except that in the excitement and tenseness of the season, reason was on leave. First insidiously, but later openly and brazenly, they started and continued to fan the embers of hatred that resulted in July 29 and the pogroms that preceded and followed it.

Biafran Major-General Alexander Madiebo captured the virulent propaganda thus: “By the end of April 1966, the press and radio of the North had joined in the hostile campaign against the South. These mass information media were then fully employed in preparing the people’s mind for the coming counter-coup. Starting from the beginning of May, 1966, Radio Kaduna played every day for three weeks, recorded speeches of late Sir Abubakar (Tafawa Balewa) and Sir Ahmadu (Bello). These political campaign speeches were carefully selected to arouse tribal feelings, passion and hatred against the people of the South. While Radio networks blared the speeches, the official Government daily newspaper New Nigerian, carried daily for some time serialized articles on the Islamic war of Conquest or Jihad, both in English and local vernaculars.” (The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War, Fourth Dimension Publishers, Enugu, p. 35.)

The anti-South or, more appropriately, the anti-Igbo rhetoric and plots moved on three fronts. Northern journalists and elites trumpeted the propaganda. Northern politicians, included Mallam Aminu Kano, galvanized the mobs while Gowon, the Army Chief, superintended the military angle. It is often said that Lieutenant Colonel Murtala Mohammed led the counter-coup. But this was only because he was the visible face. The contention here is that Gowon was the actual leader of July 29. He wisely acted surreptitiously because of the position he held and because he was under surveillance. Had he not been party to the counter coup, it would have floundered in its early stages, or even nipped in the bud. READ FULL STORY HERE>>>CLICK HERE TO CONTINUE READING>>>

Gowon, then and now

There are many reasons for this conclusion. From the start of the action on July 29, Gowon was incommunicado until August 1, 1966, when he surfaced at the Ikeja Cantonment to be declared Head of State by anAir Force Sergeant named Paul Dickson. Contrast his curious disappearance on July 29, 1966 to January 15 when, as an officer without command who had arrived the country only two days earlier, he joined the Major Hans Anagho team appointed by General Ironsi to go in pursuit of the coup makers. Again, when Government House, Ibadan, was under siege, Gowon had a telling telephone conversation in which Major Theophilus Danjuma told him that he was on the verge of leading his troops to storm the building and seize Ironsi and Fajuyi. According to Danjuma’s authorized biography, the conversation continued thus:
Gowon: Can you do it?
Danjuma: We’ve got the house surrounded and sealed off, Sir. We can do it.

Gowon: Alright. But please make sure there is no bloodshed. (Danjuma: The Making of a General, by Lindsay Barrett. Fourth Dimension Publishers, Enugu, 1980.pp 52-53.)

Could Gowon’s acquiescence to high treason in this dialogue be the spontaneous reaction of someone unaware of the details of what was going on? Is it not more rationale to believe that Danjuma had initiated the telephone conversation,in order to give a “sitrep” to the superior officer whose orders he was carrying out? After all, Lieutenant Colonel Hillary Njoku has argued that Danjuma was not qualified to be a part of on Ironsi’s national tour.

“In accordance with staff procedure, Lt-Col. Jack Gowon as the Chief of Staff, Army, was the right man, not Major Theophilus Danjuma, to accompany the Supremo on military matters. If for any reason he was absent, the next man to him should have gone with the Supreme Commander. In that case the General Staff Officer Grade One, Lieutenant Colonel P. Anwunah, or, as it was an administrative tour, the Adjutant-General should have joined or at least represented the Army. Theophilus Y. Danjuma was a major and deputy to Lieutenant Colonel M. Ivenso who was the Adjutant General of the Army…Protocol wise, detailing a Grade Two Staff Officer to represent the Army on a country-wide tour of the Head of State was a capital insult to the person and office of the Head of State.” (A Tragedy Without Heroes: The Nigeria-Biafra War, Fourth Dimension Publishers, Enugu. pp 86-87.)

But Gowon made the anomalous posting, all the same. Max Siollun was, therefore, wrong to state in his essay entitled The Northern Counter-Coup Of 1966 – The Full Story that, “Ironsi had with great courage entrusted his personal security to northern soldiers (including Major Yakubu Danjuma, Lieutenants William Walbe, Titus Numan and Sani Bello). One of his ADCs was the younger brother of Lt-Col James Pam (who had been murdered during the January coup). By surrounding himself with northern soldiers, Ironsi sealed his own fate.”(Seewww.nigerialinks.com>articles>Siollun).

Ironsi’s fate was sealed because he came from an ethnic group not ordained by God for perpetual leadership of Nigeria. Ironsi had not placed Danjuma in the ranks of his personal guards. Gowon did. Ironsi had four ADCs: Timothy Pam (Police), Dennis Okujagu (Navy), Andrew Nwankwo (Air Force) and Sani Bello (Army. None of them was party to the execution ofJuly 29. As a matter of fact, Bello and Nwankwo were among those scourged by Danjuma and his men, and led to the Iwo execution ground with their hands tied behind their backs. Perhaps Ironsi would have been wise if his personal security were in the hands of his Umuahia kinsmen. But Gowon had established a Federal Guards Battalion composed entirely of his Angas people. Yet, his removal from office was swift and ignominious.

Thus, as July 29 dawned, Danjuma who was advantageously positioned had troops from the 4th Battalion in Ibadan given to him by its Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Akahan. Those were the troops he used to replace Ironsi’s regular guards. They took Ironsi and Fajuyi and subjected them to unimaginable torture, after which he gave “whispered instructions” to those that led the duo, all blood and gore, to their untimely deaths at Iwo. The junior officers who led Ironsi and Fajuyi to their Golgotha included Lieutenants GarbaPaiko, GarbaDuba, William Walbe, Titus Numan, and Jeremiah Useni,as well as some non-commissioned officers and many recruits.

The counter-coup spread to all parts of the country except the East where Lieutenant Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu was Military Governor and Lieutenant Colonel Eze Ogunewe the 1st Battalion Commander. In Kaduna they shot Lieutenant Colonel Israel Okoro, the Commander of the 3rd Battalion. In Lagos they shot Major T. E. Nzegwu (not to be confused with Nzeogwu) of the Supreme Headquarters. Major Chris Anuforo was tortured to death. Major Don Okafor was buried alive. They killed Major B. Nnamani of the 2nd Battalion. The assassinated Major J. O. C. Ihedigbo. The killed Major Ekanem of the 1st Provost Company on Carter Bridge. They killed Major P. C. Obi of the Nigerian Air Force. They killed Major O. U. Isong of the 1st Reece Squadron, Kaduna. They killed Major C. C. Emelifonwu of the 1st Brigade Headquarters. They killed Major A. D. Ogunro of the Nigerian Military Training College (NMTC).

They seized Captain P. C. O. Okoye who was on his way to an overseas course near the Ikeja Airport. The Captain was”tied to an iron cross, beaten and left to die an agonizing death in the guardroom.” They also massacred Captains Iloputaife (MBE), I. U. Idika, A. O. Akpet, L. C. Dilibe, J. I. Chukwueke, J. U. Egere, T. O. Iweanya, H. A. Auna, S. E. Maduabum, G. N. E. Ugoala, and R. I. Agbazue in various military formations across the country. And they ended the lives of 15 Lieutenants all told. As for Warrant Officers, Sergeants, Corporals, Lance Corporals and Privates, about 130 of them paid the supreme price of July 29.

“The original intention of the July 29 counter coup leaders was to seize the reigns of government and then announce the secession of the Northern Region from the rest of the country. This was in line with the general mood of the people of the North whose clarion call during the May 29 disturbances was Araba or Aware (Hausa word for ‘secede’).” So wrote Ahmadu Kurfi in The Nigerian General Elections 1959 and 1979 and the aftermath, (Macmillan Nigerian Publishers Limited, Lagos, 1983; pp38-39.) Again, “Northern civilians and other ranks in the Army kept continuous pressure on us to avenge what seemed more and more to them to have been an anti-Northern coup.” So wrote Major General Joseph in Revolution In Nigeria: Another View, Africa Books Limited, London, 1980; p 60.

Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu

Well, vengeance was wreaked to the extreme, majority of the victims being clearly innocent of any crimes or offences. According to the Onyiuke Report (page 103), The May (1966) riots affected mainly the Hausa/Fulani areas of Northern Nigeria. It did not affect the Bornu Emirate to the North-East, the area commonly called the Middle Belt (comprising Benue province with Makurdi as its principal town, Plateau province with Jos as its principal town, Ilorin, and Kabba provinces. The Ilorin and Kabba provinces are mainly inhabited by the Yoruba, the Benue Province by the Tiv and Idomas and other tribes. The Bornu Emirate is mainly dominated by the Kanuri whose head Chief, the Shehu of Bornu is based in Bornu…

“The pogrom spread to all parts of northern Nigeria between September and October 1966. The main instrument of spreading the pogrom was the Federal Army and Police and thugs organized on a fairly high level to smother the susceptibilities of some of the local chiefs who opposed it. The local inhabitants especially the ex-politicians caught the fever, and horror and disaster spread. The rot was complete.”

After Ironsi was toppled and assassinated, and after “God in his power (had) entrusted the responsibility of this great country of ours into the hands of yet another Northerner,” the Republic of Northern Nigeria was not declared. Why? Despite Gowon’s curious denial to this day that he was going to announce secession on August 1, 1966, the fact is that the move to secede was thwarted by Western powers. According to the minutes of the Cabinet meeting of August 2, 1966 released by the British Government after the mandatory 35-year period of moratorium, and deposited and marked as CAB/128/41 kept at the British Public Records Office at Kew Gardens, London, “The Commonwealth Secretary (The Rt. Hon. Arthur Bottomley, MP) said that there had been a further mutiny in Nigeria and that Major General Ironsi, the Head of State, had been kidnapped and possibly killed. A L-Col Yakubu Gowon, who was Hausa from the Northern Region, had assumed charge of the Government with the support of the Supreme Council. He had been strongly advised by our own High Commissioner and the United States Ambassador against promoting the secession of the North from the Federation.”

The fact that the counter-coup makers did not sunder Nigeria in 1966 is the reason Nigeria remains where it is today. Max Suillon, in his 1990s essay already cited put things in perspective thus: “Now firmly in control of the army, northern officers distributed senior military postings among themselves and created a northern military dynasty. Since the counter-coup, 17 officers have occupied the post of Chief of Army Staff. Of these 17, 15 have been northerners (the only two southerners to occupy the post during that time; Lt-Generals Alani Akinrinade and Alexander Ogomudia, were appointed by General Obasanjo in 1979, and 2001 respectively). The northern soldiers who carried out the counter-coup have constituted themselves into Nigeria’s de facto ruling class. Of the soldiers who took part in the counter-coup, four (Murtala, Buhari, Babangida, Abacha) became Head of State. Several of them held prominent government and security positions throughout the last three decades. For example, Lieutenants Walbe, Duba, and Shelleng were among the party that murdered Maj-Gen Ironsi and Lt-Col Fajuyi. Walbe was rewarded by being appointed as Gowon’s personal bodyguard, and today Duba and Shelleng are members of the millionaire Generals club, sitting atop massive fortunes and business empires acquired after years of participation in military regimes. MammanVatsa was the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory until he tried one coup too many. Abba Kyari and Baba Usman served as military governors under Gowon for eight years. Gado Nasko became a Major-General and was the Minister of the Federal Capital territory during the regime of Ibrahim Babangida. Some of the mutineers occupy prominent government positions till today; Lt-Gen Danjuma (who led the arrest party that abducted Ironsi and Fajuyi) is the current Defence Secretary, and Maj-Gen Abdullahi Mohammed is the current Chief of Staff at the presidency).”

In reverse, July 29 destroyed Igbo relevance in Nigerian politics. Ndigbo became something like fourth-class citizens, to be seen and rarely heard; to be killed at random without consequence; to be told to their faces that Nigerian leadership was outside their tiny scope of entitlements. They may stray into the Armed Forces but could never aspire to ranks above Colonel, except they were in the Medical or Education Corps. They may excel in academics or soccer or the sciences. Their entrepreneurial skills may match the best anywhere in the world. But in the scheme of national affairs, they must stand back.

Things have now gone full cycle. After five decades, the architects of July 29, 1966 have, aided by accessories to political change, assumed power yet again, cloaked like democrats.
But the leopard never changes its spots. Which is why, in informed circles, their mantra of change elicits anything between skeptical smiles and outright indignation.

– Chuks Iloegbunam (iloegbunam@hotmail.com),is the author of Ironside, the biography of General Aguiyi-Ironsi. This article was published on different media platforms exactly two years ago in Nigeria

 

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Comprehensive History of Ilorin and the Reign of Afonja

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Before we begin with the history of Ilorin, here are few details that should be known. Ilorin is a city, traditional emirate and capital of Kwara State in Southwestern Nigeria. It is located on the Awun River, a minor tributary of the Niger. As of the 2006 census, Ilorin had a population of 777,667, making it the 7th largest city by population in Nigeria

 

History of Ilorin

The suzerainty of the old Oyo Empire on Ilorin, in the 17th Century, was directly influenced by Alaafin Ojigi’s interest to save the Igbomina Yoruba area that had been turned slave reservoirs by the Nupes. He established the first administrative structures to coordinate the scattered settlements later known as Ilorin. The first of the Oyo Ajele (Resident) to be appointed was Laderin. His son, Pasin, who was also succeeded by his own son, Alugbin, the father of Aare Afonja succeeded Laderin…Click Here To Continue Reading>> …Click Here To Continue Reading>>

 

The personal animosity between Aare Afonja and Alaafin Aole which degenerated to show of strength between the two leading figures in the administration of Oyo Empire culminated to the summary termination of Alaafin Aole and declaration of independence for Ilorin. Aare Afonja’s effort to consolidate his power and position as the supreme authority in Ilorin dictated two major actions that eventually played key roles in the historical changes witnessed in Ilorin.

One of such action of the Aare was his contact with Shehu Alimi through his friend Sholagberu. The second was the Aare’s decision to recruit slaves who ran to Ilorin from their masters in Oyo town, after Ilorin had been declared independent from Oyo. The first of the Aare’s steps was to seek spiritual support for his new position and status.

He, therefore, persuaded Shehu Alimi to migrate into Ilorin town from Kuwo (a suburb of Ilorin) where he had then settled, after his Islamic evangelical mission to parts of Yoruba land, such as Oshogbo and even Oyo Ile’. It was for Aare’s persuasions that Shehu Alimi eventually migrated to Ilorin town. On the recruitment of the slaves who ran to Ilorin as a sanctuary, the Aare saw their presence in Ilorin as an advantage to have soldiers who do not have any relations with the local environment.

Are Ona Kakanfo Afonja
Are-Ona-Kakanfo Afonja

Thereby, the question of betrayal would be out of the way. Given the circumstances of his declaration of independence for llorin from Oyo. Aare’s confidence and high regards for the slave soldiers soon result to its abuse. The slave soldiers saw themselves as an important element to the survival of llorin as an independent entity. Therefore they resorted to committing atrocities and rapacity that hii’boun, the left wing commander of the Aare’s army, had to draw Aare’s attention to the implications of the excesses of the slave soldiers, who were commonly referred to as Aare’s servant. Aare Afonja’s efforts to restructure the army with the aim of preventing further damages by the slave soldiers for their rapacity, mobilized the slave soldiers to organize a mutiny, which eventually resulted into Aare Afonja’s death.

The history of Ilorin has it in its profile that the death of Aare Afonja in about 1813 naturally created a vacuum in the political leadership of Ilorin. Given the fact that his slave- recruited soldiers killed him, and publicly burnt his corpse, and there was no ready counter force to evolve a new political leader. Ilorin had to remain in a state of interregnum for some time. The Baba Isale, Agboin, was as at then very sick and could not mobilize a counterforce to arrest the confusing situation’.

On the part of Shehu Alimi, he concentrated on his cleric duties by leading a group of Muslims in daily prayers. The death of Shehu Alimi in about 1817. Four years after Aare Afonja’s death, was a turning point in the history of llorin. It opened a new course of events that culminated into the emergence of a new-political structure in the emirate.

Shehu Alimi, as a committed Islamic cleric, whose major duty was leading congregation in prayers as the Imam, certainly had no other position that could be inherited by his children. As an Imam, which is a religious position, was indeed not necessarily to be inherited by the family of the immediate past Imam.

Any Muslim could actually vie for the position”. This situation explains why the contest for the position of the Imam held by Shehu Alimi in Ilorin, was contested for by AbdulSalami, Shehu Alimi’s first son, and Bako from Serikin Gambari’s family. The support given to AbdulSalami by personalities such as Sholagberu and other prominent Yoruba group leaders close to Shehu Alimi, made AbdulSalami be victorious over Bako.

As the Imam of the mosque where the slave soldiers often congregate to perform their daily prayers, AbdulSalam and Shitta. His younger brother was fast at establishing close relations with them”. It was by these relations that the slave soldiers were turned to be used to attack those that were accused of being unfriendly to AbdulSalami’s leadership in the mosque.

They intimidate those considered to be influential within the Ilorin community and could checkmate their political ambition and attack settlements such as Okesuna, which on its own was an entity. The successful use of the slave soldiers by AbdulSalami and Shitta to terminate all form of oppositions to the realization of their political ambition in Ilorin actually paved the way for the declaration of Ilorin as an emirate in about 1823 ‘.

An army was raised under Toyeje, the Bale of Ogbomoso, who succeeded Aare Afonja as Kakanfo. The army camped at Ogele, expecting to easily run over the Fulani authority in Ilorin: The Fulani had anticipated and prepared for the attack. They demanded that each of the Ihdogun should raise an army among their respective linguistic group to complement the Jammah.

Having carefully studied the organizational weakness of the Yoruba army on the battled field, the Ilorin army concentrated on the use of calvary. This inflicted heavy human loses on the Yoruba army. A good number of Yoruba towns in the Ibolo areas were destroyed and some others were fully captured″.

According to the history of Ilorin, the defeat of the allied forces of the Yoruba was a morale booster for the emerging forces in Ilorin. On the other hand, the morale of the Yoruba allied forces waned because of the betrayal noticed amongst them. The tactical error on the part of the Yoruba allied forces was that they concentrated mainly on the military organization. They were not sufficiently diplomatic. Their situation would not have been as bad had they penetrated into the rank and file of Yoruba people that were aggrieved by acts of the Fulani, who imposed themselves as the authority in Ilorin.

The Mugbamugba War

After a short respite, the Yoruba re-organised and resolved to get rid of the Fulanis in Ilorin. This time, they went into alliance with Monjia, the King of Kabbah. The encounter took place between March and April when the locust fruits were ripe for harvest. The lingering effects of the previous war were apparent: A good number of places were still deserted, while there was not enough farm that could sustain the long camping of the army. Both the besiegers and the besieged soon resorted to living on the locust fruit (Igba). Hence the war took its title Mugba Mugba’.

Once again, the allied forces of the Yoruba were defeated. Their knowledge of how to deal with the power of Ilorin was still defective. The successive defeat of the Yoruba allied forces made them to lose the courage for launching a further attack. On the other hand, the emirate army grew to be more confident and aggressive. Consequently, many more Yoruba towns and villages were destroyed and the peoples’ properties were looted by the ravaging army of Ilorin.

Two major factors were responsible for the success of the llorin army: superior use of the calvary and effective use of diplomacy. They penetrated the ranks of the Yoruba leaders to cause disaffection and personality clash amongst them. There was, for instance, an intense rivalry between Toyese, the Kakanfo of Oyo at Ogbomoso and Adegun, the Onikoyi. The alliance of llorin with the Onikoyi eventually led to a war between the two.

The destruction of most of the Yoruba towns and villages by the victorious army of Ilorin. turned a good number of Yoruba who lived in them, refugees. They were scattered all over Yorubaland and this continued to be a source of worry for cities that had riot been touched by war. This explains why the Yoruba leaders could not live with the reality of Ilorin emirate army’s victories. Hence they recouped to launch another attack.

Kanla War

As a result of successive Ilorin victories over the Oyo forces, the powers and influence of the Alaafin of Oyo continued to dwindle to the point of their been limited to the capital. More and more of the old Oyo empire’s provinces declared their independence from Oyo’s authority and tributes were no longer paid to the Alaafin.

It was at this period of anarchy and confusion that Alaafin Amodo, one of the grandchildren of Alaafin Abiodun’s twin brother, came to the throne. Understanding the situation as it was, the Alaafin began his reign by trying to consolidate the remaining loyalists to his institution and stretching arm of friendship to prominent chiefs around Oyo.

Fulani Warriors

The Alaafin identified Lanloke. the Chief of Ogodo as one of such prominent and powerful chiefs. Ogodo, according to its historical origin used to be a Nupe town:”. But by the end of the 18th century, Yoruba migrants from Oyo had taken over the town for commercial reasons”‘. Ogodo grew to become a big commercial city that served as the exchange centre for the Yoruba and Nupe traders. They traded in different merchandise and thus the powers and influence of its ruler grew with its relevance.

Alaafin Amodo’s interest in Ogodo was to renew the blood ties with the Yoruba population in the town, use their influence and contacts to rebuild the powers of his institution. He gave out his daughter in marriage to Lanloke, the chief of Ogodo. Rather than appreciate this kind of gesture of Alaafin Amodo Lanloke grew to become more conscious of his new influence, powers and wealth. He treated Alaafin Amodo’s daughter with indignity and disrespect. This was deliberately to spite her father as the Alaafin. At one of such contemptuous treatment of Alaafin Amodo’s daughter, Lanloke nearly beat his wife to the point of death”.

Lanloke was neither remorseful for his act, nor appreciate the possible consequence of his action. He was rather boastful and care free about what the Alaafin would do. He allied with Ilorin, and assumed a more aggressive posture”. With the support of Ilorin soldiers. Chief Lanloke attacked Oyo town and the city was sacked. Oyo thus became an Ilorin tributary. READ FULL STORY HERE>>>CLICK HERE TO CONTINUE READING>>>

Alaafin Amodo became very bitter and depressed as a result of the humiliation he suffered and as a result of the destruction of Oyo. He remained very hopeful. He continued with the diplomatic efforts at fostering unity among the Yoruba chiefs that had been divided by jealousy and petty rivalry.

Alaafin Amodo eventually brought the divided Yoruba chiefs together and therefore raised a formidable force to engage the Ilorin army. The battle took place at Kanla. from where the battle took its name. The Yoruba chiefs were together physically, but they were spirits apart. The rivalry among them resulted in treachery. For instance, the Onikoyi was known to be sick and unfit to be on the field but the Edun of Gbogun deliberately encouraged him to man a weak point so that llorin army, which he had arranged with, could penetrate the Yoruba forces and rout them.

Already informed of the treachery in the Oyo camp, the Ilorin forces, merely mounted defences on the other fronts as they voraciously attacked from the Onikoyi’s front”‘. The Onikoyi was rounded up and killed. llorin quickly seized the opportunity to penetrate the Yoruba lines and drive the soldiers out of the battle field.

Many of the remaining towns and villages still loyal to the Alaafm were attacked, destroyed and deserted. Chief Oja, the first settler at Ago (the present-day Oyo town), was among those that were drowned in river Ogun as they fled from the invading llorin forces. The recurring victory of llorin army over the allied forces of the Alaafin was naturally bound to boost the morale of the emirate army and its allies, yet successive Alaafin of Oyo were undaunted. Consequently, they continued to recoup and re-launch attack against llorin.

The Eleduwe War and the history of Ilorin

The distress that followed the last defeat of Oyo empire and its allies by the ravaging army of llorin and its allies was attributed to the depression of Alaafin Amodo, who eventually got ill and died. Prince Oluewu was unanimously elected as the new Alaafin’. Going by the process of selecting the preceding Alaafin of Oyo before Oluewu. Potential candidates used to engage themselves in fierce contests that it was never possible to select an Alaafin by unanimous votes of the Oyomesi, (Oyo empire’s king makers). This explains the very low morale of both the royal families and people. The position of the Alaafin had been reduced to titular institution, rather than the historically known Alaafin that does not only reign but ruled.

Alaafin Oluewu was fully aware of the situation at the time of his enthronement but like his predecessors, he was full of” hope and determination to reverse the situation. Alaafin Oluewu as a person, could be described as haughty and irritable in temperament. He however, acceded to the call when Emir Shitta of Ilorin requested him (the Alaafin} to pay him the traditional homage of a vassal”. The chiefs of Oyo and members of the royal family prevailed on Alaafin Oluewu to accede to the call of Emir Shitta. to save the capital and the remnant towns that still paid their allegiance to Oyo””.

Afonja's Palace
The Palace of Are-Ona-Kakanfo Afonja

Emir Shitta received Alaafin Oluewu with every mark of honour and distinction; but he confiscated the Gbedu drum that was often beaten before an Alaafin to show his royalty. In the words of Emir Shitta: “there cannot be two kings in my dominion but one only, and that is myself. By Emir Shitta’s statement, the Alaafin and his institutions were reduced to mere subjects of the ravaging foreigners based in Ilorin. Alaafin Oluewu felt badly humiliated and insulted by the act of Emir Shitta.

He refused to honour the second call on him by the Emir to come down to Ilorin. Not even the counsel by the both Basorun and Asipa could change his mind for the fear of the consequences on Oyo by Alaafin refusal to honour Emir Shitta’s call, both Akioso, the Basorun and Ailumo, the Asipa went against the express order of Alaafin Oluewu forbidding them to go.

The Emir was disturbed and, in fact, fell insulted by the refusal of Alaafin Oluewu to honour his call. The Emir therefore decided to punish the Alaafin. He ordered Lanloke the Chief of Ogodo to ravage the suburbs of Oyo and in fact threaten the city. Alaafin Oluewu was not unprepared. He had sought and got the support of the Bariba to subdue his enemies both within and without. Those within were the Basorun and the Asipa who defied his instruction not to go on his behalf to Emir Shitta in Ilorin and those outside were the Fulani authority in Ilorin and their allies.

With the alliance of the Bariba led by Eleduwe, Alaafin Oluewu was able to punish both the Asipa and the Basorun with death. He went further to attack Ogodo and raised down Gbodo. Ilorin army and its allies were defeated. They were pursued until they ran into the flooded Ogun River. Most of the Ilorin soldiers were drowned.

Alaafin Oluewu and his Bariba allies were naturally elated by their victory over the combined army of Ilorin and its allies. Therefore, he decided to summon warriors and chiefs all over the old Oyo empire’s territories. Alaafin Oluewu was unaware that some of these Yoruba chiefs he invited were, in alliance with Ilorin and all of them cherished their independence from Oyo’s authority. Alaafin Oluewu was of the belief that those in alliance with llorin were doing it out of necessity and not out of convenience. Hle held the opinion that there was a general resentment of foreigner’s rule over llorin.

The immediate response of the Yoruba chiefs to Alaafin Oluewu’s confirmed his feelings that they would be glad to be free from the foreigner’s yolk. At a meeting of the war council chaired by Alaafin Oluewu and in which Eleduwe. the Bariba warrior and invited Yoruba chiefs were present the modus operandi for prosecuting the war to overrun llorin and reclaim the old Oyo empire’s territories were concluded.

The Fulani authority in Ilorin was indeed distressed by the response to Oluewu’s assemblage of the Yoruba warriors and chiefs. Being fully alive to the seriousness and the extent of florin’s defeat at Gbodo encounter, the Emir was desperate to avert the impending calamity on his territory and people. Added to the desperate moves of the Emir was the fear of the Bariba warrior, Eleduwe or Waru Kura, the commander of the Bariba ally of Oyo Empire. The llorin people referred to him as Ikoko (Wolf) because he was commonly known for destroying every living being in the area he captured.

The Emir embarked on both internal and external moves to save the situation. On the external wing. Emir Shitta sent for assistance from the Sultan of Sokoto his suzerain. Ibrahim Khalil. the third Emir of Gwandu. personally led a joint force of Sokoto and Gwandu warriors to aid llorin.

On the local side, the Emir tried to identify individuals and groups of people among the Yoruba that had an axe to grind with the Alaafin. He was able to locate one Yusufu Bale, the progenitor of the present Alanamu family of llorin.

Yusufu was a renowned warrior specially known for the manner in which he overcame his enemies. He physically beat the enemy to capture them, and was therefore fondly referred to as Alana-mu.

Yusufu Bale or Alana-mu considered his invitation to join the llorin army against the organized team of Alaafin Oluewu, as good opportunity to revenge the unfortunate circumstances under which he packed out of Oyo town and settled at Reke, a village not too far from llorin”‘. He supported llorin with his army, and was also involved in the diplomatic game, employed by the authority in llorin to play the Yoruba chiefs against one another”‘.

At the time llorin was preparing for the impending war with the combined forces of the Yoruba and the Bariba’s from all fronts, old rivalry, sharp differences and fears of Bariba domination were seriously drumming in the war camp assembled by Alaafin Oluewu. For instance, special privileges accorded to the Bariba by Alaafin made the Yoruba warriors fear that the Bariba would only be replacing the established Fulani hegemony already in Ilorin and that the Bariba dominance or rule over them will be real rather than the mere rendering of assistance to engage Ilorin.

Most of the Yoruba chiefs assembled by Alaafin Oluewu to sack Ilorin, actually cherished their respective independence. Their fears were further compounded by the experience of their direct encounter with the Bariba, who had actually began to behave like the new lords of the Yoruba chiefs. They had no doubt that they would be treated later like a captured people after the war.

This explains why some of them made up their minds to undermine the proclaimed interest of the joint Yoruba forces against Ilorin. At the heat of the battle, Prince Atiba of Ago and Timi Bamgbaiye of Ede. deliberately left the wing of their command, to make the penetration of Ilorin army possible. Both Alaafin Oluewu and the Bariba warrior Wan kura were therefore rounded up. Both of them fell in the battle ‘.

The death of Alaafin Oluewu. and the leader of the Bariba allied forces, Warikura, was indeed a turning point in the History of Ilorin as a sovereign state and power; the entire politics of Yorubaland and warfare that characterized the whole of the nineteenth century. The victory of Ilorin army in all its war encounters against Oyo army and its allies have subject of controversy among scholars and philosophers.

While some of them attributed the cause to high rate and degree of treachery exhibited by the Yoruba at a point of war, that their unity was crucial to their collective survival to the historical curse evoked by Alaafm Aole. that “Yoruba would never again be united and that they would be ruled by their slaves after his failure to get Aare Afonja and other prominent Oyo chiefs exterminated by sending them to attack Ilorin. Others see it as a normal trend in political evolution, that such rivalry, treachery and suspicion are prevalent in some other personal and group relations’.

The news of the death of Warukura and Alaafin Oluewu readily aggravated the confusion in old Oyo. This led to the exodus of its inhabitants. The attack on old Oyo and remnants of places that still paid allegiance to the Alaafin by Lanloke the Chief of Ogodo. who had always been an inveterate enemy of Oyo and an active ally of Ilorin. accelerated the people’s migration to different directions. While a good number of Oyo migrants went to Kisi. Some others went to Igboho. A noticeable number even went to Ilorin”. Thus, Oyo was deserted and it went into ruins.

 

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If You See These Three Lines In Your Palm Instead Of Four, This Is What It Means

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The lines on our palms, particularly the heart line, head line, life line, and fate line, have long been a subject of interest in palmistry, the ancient art of interpreting the palm to reveal information about an individual’s personality, life path, and future. While most people have four main lines in their palms, some may notice only three lines, and this can hold particular significance in palmistry.

The absence of the fourth line, commonly the fate line, can be one of the most intriguing observations. The fate line is believed to represent destiny or the influence of external factors on one’s life, such as significant life events or events out of one’s control…Click Here To Continue Reading>> …Click Here To Continue Reading>>

 

If you see three lines instead of four, it could indicate that you are someone who creates your own path, rather than being heavily influenced by fate. Palmists believe this suggests an individual who is more independent and in control of their destiny, making decisions based on personal choice and effort rather than external forces. The absence of the fate line might also point to someone who has experienced a life of free will, without clear guidance or obstacles that dictate the course of their life.

If your palm shows only three lines, it could also mean that you are adaptable and resilient, able to face challenges head-on without being overly reliant on fate or predetermined outcomes. This may symbolize an individual who embraces change and is capable of creating new opportunities, as opposed to being tied to a specific life plan or structure. READ FULL STORY HERE>>>CLICK HERE TO CONTINUE READING>>>

Moreover, palmists often associate this three-line configuration with individuals who possess a high degree of mental clarity and emotional stability. The reduction in lines may be viewed as a sign of focus and concentration, suggesting that the person is more pragmatic, relying on intellect and logic rather than emotional impulses or predestined paths.

Ultimately, while palmistry offers a fascinating way to reflect on personality traits and life directions, it’s important to remember that it is not a science. People should interpret these signs with an open mind, understanding that they are just one of many tools to explore human behavior and experiences.

 

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The Story of a Young Woman Who Tested Positive for Pregnancy Without Engaging in Sexual Intercourse

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In an incident that has captured widespread attention, a young woman shared her unique experience of discovering she was pregnant without engaging in any sexual activity. This revelation, initially met with skepticism, led to several hospital examinations where medical professionals confirmed her claims. The event, reported by Kessben Online, has sparked curiosity and debate, leaving many pondering the possibility of such a phenomenon.

The young woman, whose identity has been withheld for privacy reasons, recounted how she initially experienced the symptoms of pregnancy. Like any other person in her situation, she was confused and alarmed, knowing she had not been involved in any relationship that could lead to conception. Her family, equally baffled, decided to seek medical guidance to understand the situation…Click Here To Continue Reading>> …Click Here To Continue Reading>>

 

After visiting multiple hospitals and undergoing numerous examinations, doctors confirmed the pregnancy and validated her claims of not having engaged in any intimate activity. While such cases are exceedingly rare, medical science acknowledges the occurrence of virgin pregnancies, also known as parthenogenesis. This phenomenon, observed in certain animals, remains highly improbable in humans. However, the possibility of scientific anomalies or spiritual interpretations cannot be entirely ruled out.

Religious and spiritual communities have been quick to draw parallels between her experience and stories from sacred texts, such as the Virgin Mary in Christian teachings. Some believe this could be a sign of divine intervention, while others emphasize the need for scientific research to uncover the truth. The story has also reignited discussions around reproductive health, medical anomalies, and societal attitudes toward such extraordinary claims. READ FULL STORY HERE>>>CLICK HERE TO CONTINUE READING>>>

Kessben Online’s coverage of the event has attracted mixed reactions from readers and experts. Some argue that modern science should have definitive explanations for such cases, while others maintain that not every occurrence can be easily categorized or understood. This story also raises questions about the stigma attached to unconventional experiences and the importance of empathy when addressing such claims.

While the details surrounding the young woman’s pregnancy remain a mystery, her journey highlights the intersection of science, faith, and human curiosity. As her story continues to circulate, it serves as a reminder of the complexities of human life and the potential for the unexplained to challenge our understanding of the world.

 

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